means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing …

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may … certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce socially harmful activities and thus be …

This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals …

. Simulations with a least squares learning rule show that the one-shot model is a good approximation when the imprecision of …

. Simulations with a least squares learning rule show that the one-shot model is a good approximation when the imprecision of …

(2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search … frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative expected earnings in high-ability jobs and, thereby, enhances imitation … priori. Numerical results show that firm learning does not increase labor market efficiency. …

increase in settlement upon a denial. Thus, ex ante, learning leads to more settlement. Nevertheless, the anticipation of … learning and increased chances of settlement do not affect the initial filing decision …

psychology of learning, and work from social scientists on learning. The paper makes the following claim: typically the law … reaches its addressees indirectly. The law is not followed, it is learned. There are two distinct learning objects. Throughout … take the form of schema-like social mirror rules, or of exemplars. Learning also is the key to understanding how …