I develop an equilibrium model with collateral constraints in which rational agents are uncertain and learn about the equilibrium mapping between fundamentals and collateral prices. Bayesian updating of beliefs by agents can endogenously generate booms and busts in collateral prices and largely...

This paper studies the interaction of agents' collateral price beliefs, credit constraint and aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. Learning strengthens the role of collateral constraints in aggregate fluctuations. Under Heterogeneous learning rules, numerical simulations...

This comment shows that the "optimality" conditions in Assenza and Berardi (2009, JEDC) "Learning in a Credit Economy" imply that agents' "optimal" choices are either suboptimal or infeasible. It presents the correct optimality conditions and discusses the effect on the E-stability condition of...

The paper presents a model of housing and credit cycles featuring distorted beliefs and comovement and mutual reinforcement between house price expectations and price developments via credit expansion/contraction. Positive (negative) development in house price fuels optimism (pessimism) and...

This paper develops an equilibrium model with a housing collateral constraint in which rational agents are uncertain about the collateral price process. Bayesian learning by agents can endogenously generate booms and busts in collateral prices and significantly strengthen the role of the...