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We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593440
play). The fixed points of the model are not necessarily at the Nash equilibria of the payoff matrices but are a function … of both the Nash equilibria and the parameters of the model. The stability of these fixed points also depends on both the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677865
Experimental data is used to test a variety of learning models using a model that extends several of the existing learning models. Generally, the parameter estimate are in the expected ranges. Individual agent parameter estimates indicate that there is considerable individual heterogeneity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677870
This paper is concerned with the modeling of strategic change in humans’ behavior when facing different types of opponents. In order to implement this efficiently a mixed experimental setup was used where subjects played a game with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for 100 rounds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789888
We present a dynamic model of jurisdiction formation in a society of identical people. The process is described by a Markov chain that is defined by myopic optimization on the part of the players. We show that the process will converge to a Nash equilibrium club structure. Next, we allow for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146909
We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 × 3...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147110
makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning" equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169616
We propose a simple payoff-based learning rule that is completely decentralized, and that leads to an efficient configuaration of actions in any n-person finite strategic-form game with generic payoffs.  The algorithm follows the theme of exploration versus exploitation and is hence stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009190182
We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661508
makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria - ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his …. In this case full learning equilibria exist …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427