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In many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. We ask...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369072
We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning processes. We show that when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on more recent experience that the time average of play often converges in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369088
We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 × 3...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147110
In many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has explained this phenomenon by demon-strating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. Taking as a starting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005417209
In many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. We ask...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750734
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750736
Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively di®erent from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636467