We study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected...

We study the informational role of prices. To that end, we consider the framework of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. When the competitive fringe is large enough, there exists a unique fully revealing equilibrium, in which the price conveys full information about the quality of the...

We address the issue of risk aversion in a competitive equilibrium when some buyers engage in learning and information is conveyed through the price system. Specifically, since the learning process yields uncertainty, we study the effect of risk aversion on the equilibrium outcomes of the model,...

New entrants very often spin out from established firms and because they set on a course at founding, their learning and capabilities become inextricably linked to their organizational and technological heritage. But while this heritage may provide an initial advantage, it can also generate...

This paper considers empirical work relating to models of firm dynamics. We show that a hazard regression model for firm exits, with a modification to accommodate age-varying covariate effects, provides an empirical framework accommodating many of the features of interest in studies on firm...

This Paper considers empirical work relating to models of firm dynamics. It is shown that a hazard regression model for firm exits, with a modification to accommodate age-varying covariate effects, provides an adequate framework accommodating many of the features of interest in empirical studies...

In this article we discuss the dynamics of organizational change when agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and do learn. In this framework, conjectural equilibrium is defined as a steady state of the learning process, and all the adjustment occurs in disequilibrium. We discuss the...

Empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurs make mistakes: too many enter markets and, once there, persist too long. While scholars have largely settled on behavioral bias as the cause, we suggest that this consensus is premature. These mistakes may also arise from a process in which...

This paper revisits the Kareken-Wallace model of exchange rate formation in a two-country overlapping generations world. Following the seminal paper by Arifovic (Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1996, 510-541) we investigate a dynamic version of the model in which agents' decision rules are...

We study a simple, microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority employs a Taylor-type policy rule. We analyze situations in which the self-confirming equilibrium is unique and learnable according to Bullard and Mitra (2002). We explore the prospects for the use of 'large...