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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593891
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782099
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427
at which players achieve approximate common knowledge of the state coincides with the slowest player’s speed of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215438
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning … process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are "self … state there is an extensive-form game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509154
In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous- time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a plausible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379104
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728176
We examine an Outside Option Game in which player I submits a claim for a share of a cake while player II simultaneously either makes a claim or chooses to opt out. If player II opts out, then she receives an opt-out payment while player I receives nothing. If player II opts in and if the claims...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693904
We model a simple dynamic process in which boundedly rational agents learn through their interactions with others. Of interest is to study the process of contagion where by one action 'spreads throughout the population' and becomes conventional. We vary the network of player interaction between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002435020
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350357