The paper presents a new meta data set covering 13 experiments on the social learning games by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). The large amount of data makes it possible to estimate the empirically optimal action for a large variety of decision situations and ask about the economic...

The paper presents a new meta data set covering 13 experiments on the social learning games by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). The large amount of data makes it possible to estimate the empirically optimal action for a large variety of decision situations and ask about the economic...

We designed four observational learning experiments to identify the key channels that, along with Bayes-rational inferences, drive herd behavior. In Experiment 1, unobserved, whose actions remain private, learn from the public actions made in turn by subjects endowed with private signals of...

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...

Yes, they are. We consider data from experimental cascade games that were run in different laboratories, and find uniformly that subjects are more willing to follow the crowd, the bigger the crowd is - although the decision makers who are added to the crowd should in theory simply follow suit...

This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the...

We experimentally investigate how price expectations are formed in a large asset market where subjects' only task is to forecast the future price of a risky asset. The realized prices depend on these expectations. We observe small (6 participants) and large markets (about 100 participants). In...

We present and conduct a novel experiment on a dynamic beauty contest game motivated by the canonical New-Keynesian model. Participants continuously provide forecasts for prices spanning multiple future periods. These forecasts determine the price for the current period and participants'...

We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an underlying state by observing neighbors' choices. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new...