We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...

This paper focuses on econometric issues, especially the common assumption that monetary payoff is subjects' actual utility, in estimating subjects' learning behaviors using experimental data. I propose a generalized adaptive learning model that nests commonly used learning rules. First, I show...

We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, global stability of...

This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...

We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously. In these games, payoffs and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile...

Players adaptively learn how to bargain. A characteristic function describes the available surplus. The underlying bargaining game extends the Nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement. Players' demands must be multiples of a money unit. We show that stochastically stable...

In this paper we introduce four new learning models: impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning, action-sampling learning, and payof-sampling learning. With this models and together with the models of self-tuning EWA learning and reinforcement learning, we conduct simulations over 12...