We study the effects of overconfidence in a two-period investment-decision agency setting. Under common priors, agent risk aversion implies inefficiently low first-period investment. In our model, principal and agent disagree about the profitability of the investment decision conditional on a...

This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members' effort and ability. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates' performances in order to bias the learning process in...

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...

Hotellings berühmtes "Prinzip der minimalen Differenzierung" behauptet, dass zwei Firmen, die sich miteinander in räumlichem Wettbewerb befinden, dieselbe Position wählen. Wenn man räumlichen Wettbewerb als Modellierung von Produktdifferenzierung versteht, bedeutet dieses, dass die Firmen...

Self-interested agents produce information in an attempt to convince a principal to act on their behalf. Agents provide less informative evidence than the principal prefers since doing so maximizes the probability the principal acts in their favor. If the principal faces constraints that limit...

This paper empirically studies how social learning among consumers shapes firms' optimal strategies of using advertising to signal product quality. I present an equilibrium model that describes both consumers' and firms' learning and decision-making under quality uncertainty. My model allows me...

Better informed consumers may be treated preferentially by firms since their consumption serves as a quality signal for other customers. For normal goods this results in wealthy individuals being treated better than poor individuals. We investigate this phenomenon in an equilibrium model of...

We study third-degree price discrimination in the presence of uninformed buyers who extract noisy information from observing prices. In a noisy learning environment, price discrimination can be detrimental to the firm and beneficial to the consumers. On the one hand, discriminatory pricing...

I investigate the identification of social learning in online markets. In these markets, there is often a two-stage decision making process where a consumer first chooses whether or not to search a product and then chooses whether or not to buy it. Additionally, the social learning signals are...