We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

Discriminatory programs that favor local and small firms in government procurement are common in many countries. This paper studies the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more...

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...

Bidding challenges learning theories, since with the same bid, experiences vary stochastically: the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss. In such an environment the question arises how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics. We...

We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was...

We develop a dynamic matching and bargaining game with aggregate uncertainty about the relative scarcity of a commodity. We use our model to study price discovery in a decentralized exchange economy: Traders gradually learn about the state of the market through a sequence of multilateral...

In this study, we designed a delayed payment mechanism in laboratory second price auctions (SPAs) under which subjects received a cash endowment two weeks after the experiment day and had to use their own money to pay the experimental loss (if any) on the experiment day. We compared the effect...

A large fraction of online advertisements are sold via repeated second-price auctions. In these auctions, the reserve price is the main tool for the auctioneer to boost revenues. In this work, we investigate the following question: How can the auctioneer optimize reserve prices by learning from...

The auctioning of frequency has to comply with a multitude of requirements in order to guarantee a transparent and efficient process. The German Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) has opted for a design that provides participants with information on the highest bid after each round for...