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We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971885
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974183
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097801
learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326679
understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492
We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022777
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065313
, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. -- Imitate-the-best ; learning ; exact potential games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544209
player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy according to her personal learning rule after observing a sample …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622442