This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which complements the analysis of players' actual …

We explore the stability of imitation in a 1,200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff …

competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments …

subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates …-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. -- Cournot oligopoly ; imitation ; learning …

subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates …-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. -- Cournot oligopoly ; imitation ; learning …

This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which complements the analysis of players' actual … higher profits in the past. -- information ; imitation ; Cournot oligopoly ; EWA learning …

and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those …

and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those …

beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show … effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever …