Showing 1 - 10 of 4,350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343540
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343733
We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364305
This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402918
This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236
This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440933
understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690752
We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598548
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143