We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...

Multi-product firms are modelled as locally interacting entities that gather information on the profitability of product combinations in an environment defined in terms of their currently supplied markets. They learn from their own past play. Local information gathering may slow down convergence...

According to the risk-free rate puzzle the return on safe assets is much lower than predicted by standard representative agent models of consumption based asset pricing. Based on non-additive probability measures arising in Choquet decision theory we develop a closed-form model of Bayesian...

Interdependencies in consumer behavior stem from either status-seeking consumption or compliance with social norms. This paper analyzes how a consumption act changes from a means to signal the consumer's status to a means of norm compliance. It is shown that such a transformation can only be...

In case of multiple source lending even solvent firms may be forced into bankruptcy due to uncoordinated credit withdrawals of their lenders. This paper analyzes whether a debtor firm can thwart such inefficient liquidations by offering creditors the option to delay their foreclosure decision...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Individuals either overweigh or underweigh (in Bayesian terms) their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others and each...

We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to understand the role of endogenous information in explaining asymmetric business cycles. When the economy has been in a boom in the previous period, and firms enter the current period with an optimistic belief,...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...