Probabilistic equilibrium selection is defined by equipping a set of theoretical solutions with an additive weighting function. In the context of dynamic processes, a weighting function can be constructed by assigning to each theoretical solution a weight equal to the relative size of its basin...

We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to “indirect” behavioral spillovers:...

In monopoly pricing situations, firms should optimally vary prices to learn demand. The variation must be sufficiently high to ensure complete learning. In competitive situations, however, varying prices provides information to competitors and may reduce the value of learning. Such situations...

We study a two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product, learns to reduce cost, and sells it through a retailer with a price-dependent demand. The manufacturer's second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production with a random learning rate. The...

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris [1999]), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about the other one. The DM entertains Multiplier preferences...

Models of learning and experimentation based on two-armed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning, but they are not suitable to study effects that accumulate over time. We propose a new class of models of strategic experimentation which...

We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...

In this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant...

In this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant...

This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...