I study voluntary disclosure of oligopoly firms when they learn information from asset prices. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a cost of losing competitive advantage to its rivals but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Adding a financial market helps the...

Observational learning theories often assume that people's actions can be observed. However, in many naturally-occurring environments, individuals can choose whether to disclose their behavior to others. We provide theoretical analysis of observational learning under optional disclosure...

We analyze how public disclosure of informed investors' trades results in manipulation, which in turn affects coordination and competition in a duopolistic setting. We show that disclosure always increases market efficiency but its effect on informed investors' profit is ambiguous. When informed...

We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus. Even though in many such marketplaces prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers, platforms can influence prices through (i) price-dependent promotion policies that can...

This paper shows how traders learn from post-trade identity disclosure in a currency limit order market. We establish that identity disclosure reveals information and show how traders react by reversing their order flow in line with the better informed. Informed traders primarily incorporate...

Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad...