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Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066953
. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm … firm hierarchy — division managers and Chief Financial Officers — are likely to have similar incentives, and perhaps even …, previous research focuses on equity incentives and largely ignores other elements of incentive pay. We contribute to this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112655
I study firm characteristics that justify the use of options or refresher grants in the optimal compensation packages for CEOs in the presence of moral hazard. I model explicitly the determination of stock prices as a function of the output realizations of the firm: Symmetric learning by all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047902
We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in an environment where growth opportunities arrive stochastically over time and taking them requires a change of management. The firm faces a trade-off between the benefit of always having a manager able to seize new opportunities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040704
The extant literature has used measurements of CEO risk-taking incentives which do not include the effects of …-taking incentives but also proposes a new, more direct, measure of risk-taking incentives — compensation gamma. Results show that vega …-taking incentives under normal conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965715
Because each of the agent's multitasks can have several measures, the multitask agency theory predicts that incentive devices based on these measures can be complements or substitutes. However, the existing empirical literature on multitask agency considers only complementarity. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066297
The multitask agency theory argues that incentive devices for the agent need to be viewed as a system to induce balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. This important insight has not been incorporated into the empirical study of CEO compensation. Since there can be several measures for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084983
-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence … between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain … with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
In this updated Closer Look, we examine the tensions between corporate culture, financial incentives, and employee … do you maximize the positive contribution that incentives make to culture while minimizing potentially negative outcomes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865024