Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous … literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic … contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like …

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings …. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that … the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies …

contracts that are typically observed in practice such as salaries, lump-sum bonuses, and high-performance commissions. …

rationalizes this data as plausible, and evaluates contracts according to their guaranteed expected payoff against the set of … rationalizable technologies. In this environment, robustly optimal contracts augment the contracts in the experimental data with …

by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), we demonstrate that rankings can reduce welfare distortions of optimal screening contracts …

overstated performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of optimal contracts under informational asymmetries. …

rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also … again implies that the higher the degree of imprecision aversion the less profitable flexible contracts versus rigid ones …