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One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level. In general, 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325208
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003492467
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378080
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level. In general, 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002256677
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level. In general, 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028923
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325571
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003756053
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003557359