provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But … trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …

contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty …

tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger …

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the … bottom, or both. In this paper we test the effectiveness and efficiency of these incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize … levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward …

be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …

relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a … dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task …

. -- White-Collar Employees ; Implicit Contract ; Explicit Bonus ; Reputational Equilibrium …

. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the principal is assured that his contract for each agent is implemented …, and analyze the principal's delegation choice to authorize a senior agent to contract with a junior agent based on reports … decentralized contract are driven by their incentives to share risk, and by their incentives to re-allocate their effort choices, i …