Showing 1 - 10 of 11
I present a model in which a principal selects one among many agents to develop a project and influences the agent's ex post level of effort not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project's mission. The closer the project's mission to the agent's preferred mission, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359776
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job characteristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence the agents' effort....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010414760
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012000777
Empirical evidence shows that workers care about the mission of their job in addition to their wage. This suggests that employers can use the job mission to incentivize and screen their workers. I analyze a model in which a principal selects one agent to develop a project and influences the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986072
Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job characteristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence agents' effort....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044845
Many organizations nowadays combine profits with a social mission. This paper reveals a new hidden benefit of the mission: its role in facilitating the emergence of efficiency wages. We show that in a standard gift-exchange principals highly underestimate agents’ reciprocity and, thereby,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012258529
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318086
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011953695
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent's marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012966930