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Optimal quality certification
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013369916
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Tournaments, signaling, and signaling tournaments
Daley, Brendan - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010249176
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Incentive schemes as a signaling device
Inderst, Roman - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 44 (2001) 4, pp. 455-465
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001564020
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Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
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The timing of discretionary bonuses : effort, signals, and reciprocity
Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian J. - In: Games and economic behavior 124 (2020), pp. 254-280
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432168
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The timing of discretionary bonuses : effort, signals, and reciprocity
Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian J. - 2018
In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011871948
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The Timing of Discretionary Bonuses : Effort, Signals, and Reciprocity
Boosey, Luke - 2018
In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915741
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Incentives schemes as a signaling device
Inderst, Roman - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013442895
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Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ; [1]
Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V. - 2015
-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a … some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524157
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Supplementary appendix to "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives"
Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V. - 2015
Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524158