Showing 1 - 10 of 155
We study effects of a firm's attempt to optimize an existing incentive scheme to increase sales growth for direct store delivery workers. Before optimization workers reported Ratchet Effects that lowered productivity. The altered incentive plan offered higher compensation for increased sales...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280656
This article describes the findings of a study aimed at providing a replication and extension in China of studies focused on incentive compensation practices of automobile retailers in the United States (Gibbs et al., 2004, 2009) and the Netherlands (Jansen et al., 2009). Rich, detailed data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124506
To generate downstream sales, manufacturers often spend both effort and compensation when working with their dealers. Existing theories are inconclusive about the interdependent role of the two kinds of instruments in motivating dealer effort; that is, whether they are substitutes or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928835
We study effects of a firm's attempt to optimize an existing incentive scheme to increase sales growth for direct store delivery workers. Before optimization workers reported Ratchet Effects that lowered productivity. The altered incentive plan offered higher compensation for increased sales...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422194
Delegation in hiring (DIH) is becoming a mainstream management practice among business chains worldwide, yet theoretical and empirical evidence of its effects remains scarce. DIH refers to the use of store managers to do their own recruiting, rather than relying on the headquarters human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846314
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003984691
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822065
The introduction of the W-salaries and the junior professorship through the amendment of the University Framework Act 2002 is viewed critically, both from the perspective of that time and in retrospect.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012437094
Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent's negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent's behavior when a court can make an error in determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059019
We present robust evidence that firms enlarge the executive pay gap when executive mobility is constrained by the enhanced enforceability of non-compete agreements. We interpret this finding as evidence that firms increase tournament incentives to keep executives incentivized after the loss of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014350043