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managers and shareholders upon the control of internal funds, a simple model allows to analyse the link between profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125625
2008 financial crisis. Strong and weak banks also stand apart: managers from weak banks took more risk than their peers in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002983
direct incentives from incentive fees and managers' personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724568
(2008) fail to find a general trend in hedge fund managers risk-taking behavior when their option is out of the money …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115828
This paper investigates whether CEO pay disparity reflects efficient contracting or CEO entrenchment by exploiting an exogenous event which mandated option expensing, namely, the introduction of FAS 123R. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find supportive evidence for the entrenchment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026043
(performance fees) and implicit incentives (fund flows) of asset managers. Funds with performance fees face substantially steeper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901776
. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use … employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about … three main conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128653
model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a … reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about three main … conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon increases the cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125539
We develop a continuous-time model where a risk-neutral principal contracts with a CARA manager protected by limited liability to run a project. Its output can be increased by costly unobservable managerial effort, but it is liquidated if the manager quits. The manager can trade a market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012942310
During the recent financial crisis, capital flow to hedge funds plunged, and competition among hedge fund managers … intensified. This leads to a transfer of bargaining power from hedge fund managers to investors when negotiating fund managers … managers during crisis periods. Our model predicts that when bargaining power is on the investors' side, hedge fund managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102148