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Incentivizing team leaders : a firm-level experiment on subjective performance evaluation of leadership skills
Gall, Thomas; Hu, Xiaocheng; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2023
In teamwork settings, providing effective leadership can be challenging for team leaders due to multitasking and the …, which can ultimately impede the productivity of the team. To address this problem, we conduct a field experiment at a … manufacturing firm, introducing a relative subjective performance evaluation of team leaders' leadership activities by their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278019
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Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
Gong, Guojin - 2010
This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms' first proxy disclosures under the SEC's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules, we find that 25.44 percent of our sample...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142627
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Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
Gong, Guojin - 2010
This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms' first proxy disclosures under the SEC's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules, we find that about 25 percent of our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136412
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Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
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Relational Contracting and Endogenous Formation of Teamwork
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2016
We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We first propose the two-step approach, which is useful for characterizing the equilibrium of relational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007681
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Leader effects in competition among teams : evidence from a field intervention
Casas-Arce, Pablo; Martínez-Jerez, Asís - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 97 (2022) 1, pp. 99-122
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013161540
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Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - 2016
We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864825
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Stock-based compensation plans and employee incentives
Zábojník, Ján - 2014
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
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Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger : An Experiment with Managers and Students
Montmarquette, Claude; Rulliere, Jean-Louis; Villeval, … - 2021
with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate …, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with … managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319438
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The degradation of distorted performance measures
Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645