This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences...

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social...

The extant literature has used measurements of CEO risk-taking incentives which do not include the effects of termination provisions such as severance agreements. This paper provides a general form model that allows for the valuation and computation of CEO compensation structures including...

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter...

This paper reports a 3-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns, together with their beliefs. In the last phase, four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete...

We consider how one party can induce another party to join an international emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal...

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...