Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009626489
This paper explores the consequences and implications of the "dual role of promotion" in an environment where a firm must simultaneously achieve two distinct goals - assignment and incentive provision - via the strategic use of promotions. We argue that the efficient promotion rule is generally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009536585
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009659700
In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which different levels of competition take place simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new class of tournament models, called multilayered tournaments, to capture this type of competitive environment. Among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778614
This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009513823
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003304745
This paper explores the consequences and implications of the dual role of promotion in an environment where a firm must simultaneously achieve two distinct goals - assignment and incentive provision - via the strategic use of promotions. We argue that the efficient promotion rule is generally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332465
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuoustime model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756012
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960359