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John, Kose (contributor); Litov, Lubomir (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003474941

Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry

John, Kose; Mehran, Hamid; Qian, Yiming - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 16 (2010) 4, pp. 383-399

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008649225

Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry

John, Kose (contributor); Mehran, Hamid (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003589958

Issues in corporate governance and finance

Hirschey, Mark (contributor); John, Kose (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003538910

Asymmetric benchmarking of pay in firms

Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; John, Kose; Sharma, Zenu - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 23 (2013), pp. 39-53

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239053

Incentive features in CEO compensation in the banking industry

John, Kose; Qian, Yiming - In: Economic policy review 9 (2003) 1, pp. 109-121

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001778414

On the optimality of resetting executive stock options

Acharya, Viral V.; John, Kose; Sundaram, Rangarajan K. - In: Journal of financial economics 57 (2000) 1, pp. 65-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001486851

Regulation and post-crisis pay disclosure strategies of banks

De Masi, Sara; John, Kose; Słomka-Gołębiowska, Agnieszka - In: Review of quantitative finance and accounting 61 (2023) 4, pp. 1243-1275

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014424332

Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry

John, Kose; Mehran, Hamid; Qian, Yiming - 2007

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks’ unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283351

Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry

John, Kose; Qian, Yiming; Mehran, Hamid - 2007

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222462