When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an … shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and …

, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from …

. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the …

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at … interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid management's excessive risk taking and short-run oriented …

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at …

Employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool but also as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develops a … model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a … reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about three main …

Previous literature shows that employee ownership can be used as a reward management tool or as entrenchment mechanism …. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use … employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about …