Using novel compensation data on white collar employees (WCE) in large, public U.S. firms, we examine their explicit financial incentives and implicit incentives arising from promotions and labor market opportunities. We find that employees with stronger (weaker) implicit incentives receive more...

This paper analyses the impact of CEO relative compensation on takeover premiums and bidder performance. Based on a sample of takeover deals between Australian listed targets and bidders from 2000 to 2015, we find that there is insignificant difference between bid premiums offered by CEOs who...

We investigate the consequences for losing competitors following the end of a promotion tournament. We examine CEO tournaments and find that the total incentives of non-promoted executives (NPEs) are likely to decrease significantly at the end of a tournament based on evidence of their lower...

We identify differences in performance measurement precision between jobs within the same firm as an important, yet previously unidentified, source of pay dispersion. Downes and Choi (2014) conclude in their review of prior research that pay dispersion will not cause employees to withhold effort...

This paper examines the length of time over which CEO performance is evaluated (the “performance period”) in CEO performance-based equity awards (PBEAs). Departing from the primary emphasis of agency theory on moral hazard problems, we develop a model in which short performance periods are...