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We analyze optimal labor contracts when the worker is inequity averse towards the employer. Welfare is maximized for an equal sharing rule of surplus between the worker and the firm. That is, profit sharing is optimal even if effort is contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341624
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comparison group in China, we examine how both psychological and financial incentives, together with attitudes toward risk, may … rank-based financial incentives. Our results show that performance-ranking information had a significant motivational … effect on average performance for students, but not for that of workers. Adding financial incentives based on rank provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407820
This paper examines a quasi-experiment in which we encourage student effort by setting various weekly incentives to … engage in online tests. Our identification strategy exploits i) weekly variation in incentives to determine their impact on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418868
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We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives …, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance … increases with the team's social cohesion, because social cohesion reduces free-riding behavior. In addition, team incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253632
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518015
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871711