Showing 1 - 10 of 1,102
We analyze optimal labor contracts when the worker is inequity averse towards the employer. Welfare is maximized for an equal sharing rule of surplus between the worker and the firm. That is, profit sharing is optimal even if effort is contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341624
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283941
comparison group in China, we examine how both psychological and financial incentives, together with attitudes toward risk, may … rank-based financial incentives. Our results show that performance-ranking information had a significant motivational … effect on average performance for students, but not for that of workers. Adding financial incentives based on rank provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407820
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565
This paper examines a quasi-experiment in which we encourage student effort by setting various weekly incentives to … engage in online tests. Our identification strategy exploits i) weekly variation in incentives to determine their impact on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418868
We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and private learning. Each period the agent faces a choice between two actions: a safe action with known returns (exploitation) and a costly risky action with unknown returns (experimentation). We explicitly characterize the cheapest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135182
severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967589
Productive tasks are often designed so as to make one agent's output depend on the contributions of others, in which case the agents work as a group. This paper shows that, even if organizing agents in a group has no effect on productivity, task interdependence increases the principal's expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035126
We explore when and how to reward failure in a dynamic principal-agent relationship with experimentation. The agent receives flow rents from experimentation, and divides his time between searching for evidence of success and failure about the underlying project. The principal commits in advance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012897496
return for taking on underserved tasks, and this prioritization increases as incentives power up. Bonuses may additionally be … used when incentives are sufficiently high-powered, but the optimal bonus is often non-monotone in the strength of … incentives. Our results have important implications for the design of worker reward programs on freelancing platforms such as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014359170