Traditionally, researchers have had difficulty testing the relationship between the degree of risk or uncertainty in workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to...

Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage. Agency theory's insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be...

Why are bonus/promotion schemes so widely used in reality? Are they effective in alleviating incentive problems? For the standard agency model, this paper proposes an alternative solution to the classical solution in Holmström (1979). The advantages of our solution are that (1) it is a simple...

We examine the relationships with firm performance of the internal pay gap among individual members of the top management team (TMT) and the compensation level of TMT members relative to their industry peers. We find that pay gap is positively related to firm performance and that this positive...

Purpose – This paper develops a discussion looking at whether CEO and Executive Director Remuneration have an impact on Firm Performance. Design/methodology/approach – This study entails Australia, The United States of America and The United Kingdom. The data collected is from public listed...

After decades of theoretical inquiry, a burgeoning empirical literature now debates how ownership patterns, governance choices, and executive compensation structure affect firms' competitive behavior. An often-made assumption in the debate is that relative performance evaluation (RPE) of top...

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line — using...