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We examine whether features of bank executives' compensation contracts cause them to take actions that contribute to systemic risk. Using multiple return-based measures of systemic risk coupled with an identification strategy that exploits heteroskedasticity to account for endogenous matching of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823513
Employing a novel control function regression method that accounts for the endogenous matching of banks and executives, we find that equity portfolio vega, the sensitivity of executives' equity portfolio value to their firms' stock return volatility, leads to systemic risk that manifests during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323925
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