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Bonus question : does flexible incentive pay dampen unemployment dynamics?

Gaur, Meghana; Grigsby, John; Hazell, Jonathon; Ndiaye, … - 2023

We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of unemployment dynamics and present three results. First, wage … cyclicality from incentives does not dampen unemployment dynamics: the response of unemployment to shocks is first … cyclicality from bargaining dampens unemployment dynamics through the standard mechanism. Third, our calibrated model suggests 46 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014390530

Bonus question : does flexible incentive pay dampen unemployment dynamics?

Gaur, Meghana; Grigsby, John; Hazell, Jonathon - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014429746

Bonus question : does flexible incentive pay dampen unemployment dynamics?

Gaur, Meghana; Hazell, Jonathon; Ndiaye, Abdoulaye - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014372013

Does performance pay deter job quits?

Artz, Benjamin; Heywood, John S. - 2025

We use US longitudinal survey data to examine the role of performance pay (other than profit sharing) in worker quit decisions. We argue that performance pay should increasingly be viewed as an indicator of an internal labor market rather than of a simple contemporaneous incentive. Suggestive of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015332817

Insurance and asymmetric information in wage contracts : evidence from an online experiment

Herbst, Daniel - 2025

For workers facing uncertain output, fixed-wage contracts provide implicit insurance compared to self-employment or performance-based pay. But like any insurance product, these contracts are prone to market distortions through moral hazard and adverse selection. Using a model of wage contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015414158

Evidence on Incentive Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations

Riphahn, Regina T. - 2011

The authors investigate the effect of managerial performance evaluation styles on employee work effort. Using panel data on 4,080 employees in a Swiss unit of an international company for the period 1999-2002, they test two hypotheses using paid and unpaid overtime work as effort indicators. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125219

Setting incentives : temporary performance premiums versus promotion tournaments

Meier, Volker - 2001

Two alternative relative compensation schemes are compared with respect to total output that can be generated at a given sum of salaries. While the promotion regime guarantees that any salary increase is permanent, the premium system allows a reduction in the income of an agent to the base...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398044

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Huang, Peggy - 2014

Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contracts and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067541

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Goldman, Eitan - 2014

Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contract and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068439

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185