We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

truthful. Still, the principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and possibly complement it with a team …

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

truthful. Still, the principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and possibly complement it with a team …

impact of individual and team incentives on the screening problem of employees with different degrees of motivation within …, reversal incentives occur. Conversely, reversal incentives do not arise if the principal uses team-incentives. If the principal … conditions each agent's wage on the effort of both agents and the agent's performance on the effort of his colleague (team …