We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

In this paper we consider regression models with forecast feedback. Agents' expectations are formed via the recursive estimation of the parameters in an auxiliary model. The learning scheme employed by the agents belongs to the class of stochastic approximation algorithms whose gain sequence is...

Climate skeptics argue that the possibility that global warming is exogenous implies that we should not take additional action towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions until we know more. However this paper shows that even climate skeptics have an incentive to reduce emissions: such a change of...

Support for economic reforms has often shown puzzling dynamics: there are many examples of reforms that started off successfully but nevertheless lost public support, and vice versa. We show that learning dynamics can rationalize this apparent paradox, the reason being that the process of...

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

How do people learn? We assess, in a distribution-free manner, subjects' learning and choice rules in dynamic two-armed bandit (probabilistic reversal learning) experiments. To aid in identification and estimation, we use auxiliary measures of subjects' beliefs, in the form of their...

We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly...

Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über Ansatzpunkte und Möglichkeiten zur Integration von Lernprozessen in volkswirtschaftliche Fragestellungen. Es werden alternative Methoden vorgestellt, individuelle aber auch gesellschaftliche Lernenvorgänge in ökonomischen Modellen zu erfassen.