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We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364305
where both risky arms are of the same type, we find that learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951567
where both risky arms are of the same type, we find that learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427535
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690752
understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492
We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598548
results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281423
The paper investigates social-learning when the information structure is not commonly known. Individuals repeatedly … interact in social-learning settings with distinct information structures. In each round of interaction, they use their … behavior in the long-run if and only if individuals distinguish social-learning settings and receive rich feedback after each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434567
Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über Ansatzpunkte und Möglichkeiten zur Integration von Lernprozessen in volkswirtschaftliche Fragestellungen. Es werden alternative Methoden vorgestellt, individuelle aber auch gesellschaftliche Lernenvorgänge in ökonomischen Modellen zu erfassen.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526281
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143