An irreversible investment opportunity has value V governed by Brownian motion with upward drift and random expiration. Human subjects choose in continuous time when to invest. If she invests before expiration, the subject receives V C: the final value V less a given avoidable cost C. The...

Crockett, Spear and Sunder [2006] propose a simple learning rule through which an informationally decentralized, repeated, static pure exchange economy populated by agents with standard neoclassical preferences will coordinate on a competitive equilibrium. In this paper a laboratory market is...

Crockett, Spear and Sunder [2005] propose an algorithm whereby boundedly rational agents with standard neoclassical preferences learn competitive equilibrium in a repeated static exchange economy. In this paper, a laboratory market is instituted to examine the hypothesis that people are at least...

We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment in which subjects play a two-player Cournot-Tullock game over hundreds of periods of varying length that full accounts of subjects' learning requires the consideration of, both, 'period time' and 'physical time.'

We study human learning in a individual choice laboratory task called Orange Juice Futures price forecasting (OJF), in which subjects must implicitly learn the coefficients of two independent variables in a stationary linear stochastic process. The 99 subjects each forecast in 480 trials with...