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We show that the playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012423273
We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728635
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy pro les, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy pro le, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687048
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095
The new learning dynamic of Brown, von Neuman and Nash (1950) is introduced to macroeconomic dynamics via the cobweb model with rational and naive forecasting strategies. This dynamic has appealing properties such as positive correlation and inventiveness. There is persistent heterogeneity in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947297
Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis of their equilibrium convergence properties is lacking....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854685
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137
A well known problem in economics is to describe properly a situation where N agents are repeatedly competing to use the same limited resource. A version of this problem is known in the literature as the El Farol game: week after week N agents face the decision whether to go or not to go to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537605
The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772034
The theory of learning in games explores how, which, and what kind of equilibria might arise as a consequence of a long-run nonequilibrium process of learning, adaptation, and/or imitation. If agents’ strategies are completely observed at the end of each round (and agents are randomly matched...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765246