We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...

We investigate the emergence of momentum and reversal anomalies in a general equilibrium model with complete markets and cognitively biased agents, accounting for the presence of representativeness heuristic, conservatism, and anchoring and adjusting in their beliefs. We characterize anomalies...

The behavioural finance literature attributes the persistent market misvaluation observed in real data to the presence of deviations from rational thinking of the actors involved. Cognitive biases and the use of simple heuristics can be described using expected utility maximising agents that...

This paper studies market selection in an Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets where agents learn over misspecified models. Under model misspecification, standard Bayesian learning loses its formal justification and biased learning processes may provide a selection advantage. However,...

This paper studies market selection in an Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets where agents learn over misspecified models. Under model misspecification, standard Bayesian learning loses its formal justification and biased learning processes may provide a selection advantage. Given the...

The paper, as such a draft of a chapter for the second edition of the Handbook of Economic Socielogy, Edited by Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg), is meant to offer some sort of roadmap accross a few fields of investigation concerning the relationships between technological learning and...