Global games of regime change – coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it – have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend...

This paper provides a model framework to characterize the process of stochastic learning during the period of divergence from a de jure currency regime. The model outcome shows that divergence from a de jure regime is a process of slow learning in small steps, which indicates that the learning...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to test the predictions of a dynamic global game designed to capture the self-fulfilling nature of speculative attacks. The game has two stages and a large number of heterogeneously informed agents deciding whether to attack the status quo. In the first...

Asian policymakers are giving consideration to allowing their currencies to be used by non-residents. If policy allows this and a robust fixed income market provides support, the Australian experience indicates that a currency can internationalise fairly quickly, particularly if it offers a...