Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in … which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the … strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of …

multi-dimensional beliefs possible, we develop tools for studying learning under high-dimensional misspecified models. …' successes. In our model, both the agent's information and his beliefs are multi-dimensional, allowing us to study interactions … settings. Third, the agent's beliefs are subject to "bias substitution," whereby forces that decrease his bias regarding one …

We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from … twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information …-based learning to other learning models (reinforcement learning and self-tuned experience weighted attraction learning) while using …

feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior …We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge … beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice). In the baseline treatment we …

different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can … endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …