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We test the no-trade theorem in a laboratory financial market where subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknown. Subjects receive clues on the asset value and then set a bid and an ask at which they are willing to buy or to sell from the other participants. In treatments with no gains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264465
In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes his private signal. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012621137
We test the no-trade theorem in a laboratory financial market where subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknown. Subjects receive clues on the asset value and then set a bid and an ask at which they are willing to buy or to sell from the other participants. In treatments with no gains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003772144
We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent chooses rationally, on the basis of private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752451
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009732247
We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("prior belief"), after he observes his predecessors' action; second ("posterior belief"), after he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011458967
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655808
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013193328
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663632
We present a social learning experiment in which subjects predict the value of a good in sequence. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessors' prediction; second, after he also observes a private signal. Our main result is that subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625815