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Unraveling of cooperation in dynamic collaboration

Vasama, Suvi - 2016

effort encourages higher effort and vice versa. Unraveling leads to multiple symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557309

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422207

Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422230

A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules

Josephson, Jens - 2001

In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281359

Stochastic adaption in finite games played by heterogeneous populations

Josephson, Jens - 2001

In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281436

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule imitate-the-best can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282117

Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria

Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed - 2009

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137

Constrained interactions and social coordination : conference paper

Staudigl, Mathias; Weidenholzer, Simon - 2013 - This version: May 2012

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341151

Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory

Block, Juan I.; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 135-172

period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than … mixed equilibria. When agents observe both the payoff distribution of other agents and the actions that led to those payoffs … solely about how well other agents are doing, mixed equilibria can be favored over pure ones. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020295

Strategic experimentation in queues

Cripps, Martin; Thomas, Caroline D. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 2, pp. 647-708

We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022777

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