New entrants very often spin out from established firms and because they set on a course at founding, their learning and capabilities become inextricably linked to their organizational and technological heritage. But while this heritage may provide an initial advantage, it can also generate...

We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of profit optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play myopic best response to the...

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....

We propose an extension to smooth fictitious play and prove that play converges to an ε-Markov perfect equilibrium with probability one in a class of stochastic games known as Markov potential games. We then prove a partial Folk theorem for repeated games under one-period perfect monitoring. We...

We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents'...

Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary...

This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and self train to increase productivity. We determine conditions under which the principal wants to incentivize concurrent working and training and conditions under which the agent...

Using a long-panel dataset of Japanese firms that contains firm-level sales forecasts, we provide evidence on firm-level uncertainty and imperfect information over their life cycle. We find that firms make non-negligible and positively correlated forecast errors. However, they make more precise...

Previous firm-level literature established that there are substantial costs of entry into new export markets. Chaney (2014) opens the black-box of entry costs by building a dynamic network model of international trade where firms acquire customers in new destinations through their existing...

This article analyses the ability of the learning firms in a Cournot oligopoly to discover market solutions more collusive that the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We start from the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) and of Alos-Ferrer (2004), and qualify the role of random experimenting, social...