We study the role of norm violations and learning behavior in multi- and single-worker gift-exchange games and find that working with co-workers leads to a twofold effect. First, flexible wages yield moderately higher efforts than in the single-employee treatment. The data suggests that this is...

In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fundamental. The price crashes to the fundamental when K of N agents have decided to sell. If selling decisions are private, bubbles can be sustained because people delay selling, after receiving...

Models with heterogeneous interacting agents explain macro phenomena through interactions at the micro level. We propose genetic algorithms as a model for individual expectations to explain aggregate market phenomena. The model explains all stylized facts observed in aggregate price fluctuations...

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of...

In this paper we introduce four new learning models: impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning, action-sampling learning, and payof-sampling learning. With this models and together with the models of self-tuning EWA learning and reinforcement learning, we conduct simulations over 12...

In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and their results are compared with the results from...