Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012621191
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273764
This paper explores rational social learning in which everyone only sees unordered random samples from the action history. In this model, herds need not occur when the distant past can be sampled. If private signal strengths are unbounded and the past is not over-sampled -- not forever affected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001466206
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001240352
In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world is changing stochastically over time during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060412
In the social learning model of Banerjee (1992) and Kikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), individuals take actions sequentially after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world is changing stochastically over time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060832