We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

Many governments have engaged in policy experimentation in various forms to resolve uncertainty and facilitate learning. However, little is understood about the characteristics of policy experimentation, and how the structure of experimentation may affect policy learning and policy outcomes. We...

Based on contribution patterns to parties in Germany and elsewhere, we suggest that European democracies should use a mixed system where private funding can play a larger role than public funding. In Germany the high level of public funding for parties can be reduced without expecting...

Models of electoral agency address the amount of discipline and selection that can be achieved by voters in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief-formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory...

Parliamentary institutions and partisan norms are complex, and new members of parliament are unlikely to possess an innate awareness of optimal behavior. This paper examines how new legislators adopt the behavioral patterns of incumbent members in the 6th European Parliament. The 6th EP provides...

A Bayesian agent evaluates a stream of information over a finite period before deciding on which of two alternatives to adopt. At any point, the agent is free to convert information into an informative, binary signal. When information arrives at a roughly constant rate, an agent who frequently...

People are exposed to a constant flow of information about economic, social and political phenomena; nevertheless, misinformation is ubiquitous in the society. This paper studies the spread of misinformation in a social environment where agents receive new information each period and update their...

A committee divided into two factions is considering a costly project. Support of both factions is required for the project to be approved. As long as the decision is delayed, the committee can learn which faction benefits from the project. At the equilibrium, one of the factions effectively...

Self-interested agents produce information in an attempt to convince a principal to act on their behalf. Agents provide less informative evidence than the principal prefers since doing so maximizes the probability the principal acts in their favor. If the principal faces constraints that limit...

When it comes to economic reforms in developing countries, many economists agree on broad objectives (such as fostering outward orientation). Broad objectives, however, can be pursued in many different ways, and policy experimentation is often indispensable for learning which alternative works...