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Coordination and learning in games with strategic substitutes and complements

Barthel, Anne-Christine; Hoffmann, Eric; Monaco, Andrew - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 73 (2019) 1, pp. 53-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012305866

Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games : learning theorems

Koutsougeras, Leonidas C.; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000865992

Bayesian learning without common priors and convergence to Nash equilibria

Nyarko, Yaw - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000841036

Asynchronous best-reply dynamics

Nisan, Noam; Schapira, Michael; Zohar, Aviv - In: Internet and network economics : 4th international …, (pp. 531-538). 2008

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Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648