In this paper, we study an imperfect monitoring model of duopoly under similar settings as in Green and Porter (1984 … cooperative motives. In contrast to Green and Porter (1984), our results show that in a model with learning, breakdown of a cartel …

number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

We study learning in finitely repeated 2x2 normal form games, when players have incomplete information about their … results show that the success in learning the opponent's type depends on the characteristics of the true game. The learning … equilibrium and we observe no correlation between equilibrium play and learning about the game …

is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized … fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction …

We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning …

number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …